Login is restricted to DCN Publisher Members. If you are a DCN Member and don't have an account, register here.

Digital Content Next


Policy / DCN perspectives on policy, law, and legislative news surrounding digital content

The Google antitrust ship has set its course

May 21, 2020 | By Jason Kint, CEO – DCN @jason_kint

When DCN created our original chart, where we coined the term “duopoly,” it marked the first wave of what would become five years of interest and activity, marked by intense journalistic investigation – which heats up as antitrust scrutiny does. The line of inquiry often starts with challenging whether anything is new or different. While some industry pundits like to posit that they’ve already “seen this show,” this time around the players are wiser and the stakes are even higher.

In the seven years since the Obama-era FTC issued its decision not to take action against the cool kid in their class, Google, the company has managed to triple its U.S. ad revenues (source: GOOG SEC filings) in line with the overall U.S. digital ad market (source: IAB/PwC Internet Advertising Reports). Put differently, Google has maintained its market share, which is hovering at around 50%.

How on earth has Google maintained share during the same period in which Facebook has grown from virtually nonexistent to the other half of the two-headed duopoly monster? Answer: Pilfering the open web by establishing a walled garden to shift revenues from everyone else to Google’s own properties.

Tired arguments

Yet a small handful of academics, analysts, and influencers (who often fly too close to the sun) continue to rehash the tired arguments that were widely shared back in 2013. They start by broadly painting any scrutiny of Google as a combination of the jealousy of dying legacy media and protectionism by Europe. Often, they claim that news media is manufacturing outrage with an “axe to grind” rather than rightly doing its job of holding the powerful accountable.

They misleadingly suggest that Google makes no revenue from Google News while turning a blind eye to the billions in value they collect from harvesting news content. Much of the value of search would disappear without news content for consumers to find. And when these pundits finally get down to pragmatic analysis, they point out the “gift of web traffic” publishers receive from Google’s free search engine, as if the web, and publishers, couldn’t exist without Google’s pixie dust.

The new wave

However, what these arguments miss is that the voices and minds leading the case in 2020 have evolved their understanding of tech and the marketplace. There is a significant and growing body of consistent research and investigation around the globe about Google’s anticompetitive action from savvy digital thinkers in academia, think tanks, state and federal regulator offices. Say what you want about the various Congressional hearings these days, but they undoubtedly make the committees, public, press, and thought leaders wiser on the topic

Reading long investigative competition reports may not be your cup of tea, particularly during a global pandemic. So, I’ll summarize what DCN is focusing on, what the latest research shows, and what is most important to the health of our members’ businesses.

The latest research

Two key investigative reports have been released: The Australian Competition & Consumer Commissioner (ACCC) July 2019 Final Report and the U.K.’s Competition & Markets Authority (CMA) Dec 2019 Interim Report. If you can only read one, read the latter (and don’t miss Appendix E). The U.K. investigation launched well before those in the U.S. and it offers a solid look into how Google and Facebook are being examined.

I was also delighted to see a Yale professor, Dr. Fiona Scott Morton and co-author David Dinielli, publish “A Roadmap for a Digital Advertising Monopolization Case Against Google” earlier this week. They lean heavily on the U.K. CMA report and did a masterful job of translating hefty regulator documents into a readable form that anyone who has followed our industry will understand. They assert that any eventual court case will demonstrate how Google’s established monopoly in the search business was subsequently leveraged for market power in the design, growth, and capture of value through its intermediation of ads across the open web.

Inside Google’s walled garden

It is important to understand that approximately 90% of Google’s revenue growth (3x over the last seven years) was captured on its own properties (search, Gmail, YouTube, etc.). This led to a shift of Google’s source of revenue to increase from a total of 74% to 84% from their own properties, where their costs to acquire traffic approaches zero. Not coincidentally Google was, all the while, cementing a dominant position in the buying, selling, serving, and measuring of all ads across the open web.

This shift in revenue growth towards areas where Google keeps the most revenue has only been possible because of Google’s market power and ability to see large amounts of data throughout the consumer and advertiser journey, in its own so-called “walled garden.” This allows them to optimize the customer experience in a way that will inevitably keep consumers and advertisers driving the most profit to Google.

Revealing revenue research

Just a few weeks ago, the U.K. advertiser group ISBA published a transparency report. For the first time, the report laid out empirically just how much revenue was captured by intermediaries. Google was, of course, the most substantial player on all sides of the market. (Though there was a curious mystery 15% that the researchers couldn’t lock down.) At this point, it’s beyond hypocrisy each time Google preaches “transparency” but refuses to report both gross and net revenue for its advertising services.

Based on various investigations, Scott Morton and Dinielli expose how Google has achieved this dominance. They examine how Google collects 40% of the revenues across the open web, limits the use of data, and steers consumers to its Google-owned properties with its own higher-margin ads. Google does so while appropriating publishers’ data and audiences for its own gain on its own properties and elsewhere on the web.

Anticompetitive conduct

Morton and Dinielli clearly lay out 20 examples of Google’s potential anticompetitive conduct. Many of them tie to previously published concerns and research from DCN. All will require further investigation and subpoena power – but I’m sure we can agree that they pass the sniff test.

  1. Acquiring Independent Companies To Cement Its Role Across the Ad Stack
  2. Leveraging Market Power in General Search into Display
  3. Designing Auctions That Facilitate Arbitrage and Rent Seeking
  4. Cross-Subsidizing Competitive Functions of the Ad Tech Stack with Monopolized Functions In Order to Rise Rivals’ Costs and Foreclose
  5. Deceptive Gathering and Integration of Data
  6. Strategic Disabling of Interoperability To Disadvantage Rivals
  7. Withholding Interoperability to Steer Demand and Supply Through Its Own Exchange
  8. Providing Exclusive Programmatic Access to YouTube Though Google’s DSP
  9. Retiring the Third-Party Cookie
  10. Disadvantaging Rival Exchanges by Google’s Publisher Ad Server
  11. Undermining Header Bidding Through the Development of So-Called “Open Bidding”
  12. Undermining Header Bidding Through Exclusionary Features of AMP
  13. Designing Analytics to Steer Market Participants to Google Products and Prevent Entry
  14. Resisting Transparency at All Levels of Ad Tech Stack
  15. Obscuring Fees So That Competitors Cannot Enter and Compete Effectively
  16. Using Privacy Laws as an Excuse to Hide Performance Data
  17. Thwarting Publisher Efforts to Understand Source of Payments
  18. Designing Attribution to Favor Search and Disadvantage Publishers
  19. Raising Rivals’ Costs and Foreclosure of Existing and Potential Horizontal Competitors
  20. Capturing Publisher Data in Order to Monetize Their Audiences

Antitrust investigations

Finally, we should still ask whether Google’s lobby and power somehow afford it unique protection in the U.S. market. Only time will tell. But we expect Congress’ antitrust investigation to issue a report in the next 90 days.

Nearly 50 state attorneys general, who previously announced their inquiries, are expected to move forward along with the (not easily intimidated) Department of Justice. Both have broad subpoena power as well as the U.K. and Australian reports to inform their deliberations. Providing further confidence thus far is that the Texas Attorney General office is leading the states’ investigation. They provided Google with an extensive list of nearly 130 questions focused mainly on Google’s advertising business. (Note: DCN received this “CID” through a public records request). It certainly looks like they want answers to Morton and Dinielli’s claims.

The internet has evolved, and it continues to do so. While many of the arguments media pundits and academics may have made a few years ago seemed plausible at the time, that time has passed. It is clear that serious research and reflection is being done that will inform any discussions around the duopoly, antitrust in the advertising ecosystem, and restoring the value exchange between premium content and the “virtual pipes” of technology that control and make money off its flow.